

**AUTHORITARIAN LEGACY AND DEMOCRATIC
ATTITUDES: EVIDENCE FROM INDONESIA'S
DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION**



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ABSTRAK

Penelitian ini mengkaji secara empiris bagaimana warisan otoriter pasca-demokratisasi memengaruhi dukungan individu terhadap nilai-nilai demokrasi. Penelitian ini secara khusus memfokuskan pada transisi politik Indonesia setelah runtuhnya rezim Orde Baru. Warisan otoriter diukur melalui kemenangan Golkar setelah masa transisi. Dengan menggunakan data World Values Survey gelombang ke-7 (2018), yang memuat beberapa indikator demokrasi, hasil menunjukkan bahwa kemenangan Golkar berasosiasi dengan penurunan dukungan individu terhadap nilai-nilai demokrasi—khususnya preferensi terhadap pemimpin yang kuat tanpa keterlibatan parlemen dan pemilihan umum. Analisis heterogenitas menunjukkan bahwa individu yang mengalami era demokrasi transisional memiliki dukungan yang lebih rendah terhadap nilai-nilai demokrasi, sedangkan mereka yang mengalami rezim Orde Baru cenderung menunjukkan dukungan yang lebih tinggi terhadap nilai-nilai demokrasi.

Kata Kunci: Persistensi Institusi, Demokratisasi, Nilai-nilai Demokratis, Sosialisasi Politik, Warisan Otoritarianisme

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PREFACE

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


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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

In many countries that move away from authoritarian rule, new democratic rules appear quickly on paper, elections are held, parties compete, and freedoms are formally expanded. Yet everyday politics often still looks and feels like the old system. This happens because the “rules of the game” that guide behavior, such as who has influence, how decisions are made, and how people get things done, do not change overnight. Even when constitutions and laws are updated, powerful actors can adapt and keep influence through old networks and practices. In short, formal change (*de jure*) does not always mean real change in how power works (*de facto*) (North, 1990; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2008).

Indonesia’s late-1990s transition is one example. The New Order was a military-based regime adapted a system called *dwifungsi* ABRI (*Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia*), relied on a disciplined party machine and regional bureaucracy as part of the regime’s infrastructure (Aspinall, 2005). After 1998, *Reformasi* initiated a more democratic regime, but authoritarian legacies remained visible, such as in bureaucracies, clientelistic networks, and party structures linked to the past (Tomsa, 2008; Mietzner, 2010). In practice, *de jure* rules changed, while parts of *de facto* influence persisted (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2008). When citizens keep encountering these legacies inside a new regime setup, it can shape their trust in democracy (Neundorf & Pop-Eleches, 2020).

Table 1.1
Golkar's Vote Count and Vote Share 1971-2024

Year	Vote Count	Vote Share
1971	34.348.673	62,82%
1977	39.750.096	62,11%
1982	48.334.724	64,34%
1987	62.783.680	73,11%
1992	66.599.331	68,10%
1997	84.187.907	74,51%
1999	23.741.749	22,44%
2004	24.480.757	21,58%
2009	15.037.757	14,45%
2014	18.432.312	14,75%
2019	17.229.789	12,31%
2024	23.208.654	15,29%

Source: Komisi Pemilihan Umum

Literatures about how authoritarian legacies can affect individuals' democratic attitudes have been done several times. Neundorf and Pop-Eleches (2020) explain that political attitudes can be shaped through socialization in individuals' formative years. Besley and Persson (2019) show the concept of mutual reinforcement between institutions and culture, where sustained institutional practices shape cultural attitudes. Martínez-Bravo et al. (2017) show how persistence of authoritarian government take over local governance, which could lead reduced support for democratic values. Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) show how elites invest their de facto power, making democratic reform loses its values, which possibly leads to disappointment and reduce support for the current institution.

transition. Authoritarian persistence manifests in the negative association between Golkar's electoral support in 1999 and subsequent support for democracy.

1.3 Research Purposes

The purpose of this research is to empirically analyze how authoritarian legacies can affect individuals' support for democratic values. To reach that purpose, this research uses economics theories to build the empirical model, obtaining data, formulates an estimation model using ordinal logistic regression, then estimate the model using maximum likelihood.

1.4 Research Systematic

This thesis is presented with five chapters. The first chapter introduces the research issue, specifically the question of how authoritarian legacies affect individuals' support for democratic values. The second chapter explains the mechanisms of the relationship between authoritarian legacies and support for democratic values. The third chapter specifies how the ordinal logistic regression explains authoritarian legacies and support for democratic values. The fourth chapter provides the results and discussion of the empirical analysis done. The fifth chapter provides conclusion and suggestions for the next research

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elite preferences, not by citizen demands, and participation is restricted or could be manipulated to maintain their power.

2.1.2 Democratization

Democratization refers to the process through which a political system transitions from a centralized or non-democratic rule to one characterized by free and fair elections, political pluralism, rule of law, and protection of civil liberties (Linz & Stepan, 1996; Huntington, 1991). It involves a shift from concentrated power in the hands of a few to more inclusive, participatory governance structures. Democratization does not happen in a single step, it often happens in stages, with varying degrees of success, reversals, or stagnation (Schedler, 2002).

There are many reasons why democratization happens. According to Huntington (1991), it can be influenced by factors such as economic growth, a stronger middle class, changes in values or religion, the failure of the previous regime, or international pressure to adapt democratic structures. Other scholars such as O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) emphasizes the role of political actors in democratization. They argue that democratization often starts when divisions appear among the elites, for example, between those who want to maintain strict control and those who prefer reforms. At the same time, opposition groups may push for more freedom. In this sense, democratization is not just caused by social or economic change, but also by power struggles and negotiations between political actors.

Inclusive institutions are institutions that distribute power broadly, encourage participation, promote equality, innovation, and sustainable economic growth. While extractive institutions concentrate their power in the hands of a small elite groups, leading to exclusionary economic benefits and limiting wider participation.

Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) emphasize how political and economic institutions interact through power. Political institutions allocate *de jure* political power (who governs by law). At the same time, elites may hold *de facto* political power based on resources and organization (e.g., wealth, coercion, media, patronage). Together, *de jure* and *de facto* power determine economic institutions and policies. This is why formal political change (e.g., democratization) does not necessarily change economic rules or outcomes. Elites can still use *de facto* power to keep rules working in their favor, leading to institutional persistence (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2008).

Institutional persistence occurs due to the elites' investments in preserving or maintaining their *de facto* power to gain back whatever they had lost when they had their *de jure* political power (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008). When democratization happens, political power formally shifts towards the people. Elites attempt to invest their informal power through practices such as electoral manipulation, clientelism, control over bureaucracy, or coercive method. These investments by the elites made the equilibrium of institutions remains unchanged and extractive, making a pattern called *invariance* (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008).

Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) also highlighted that for a democratic reform to succeed, it needs to create a political playing field which would be no longer

Without exposure to competing democratic values such as inclusive political education, independent media, or civil society organizations, they internalize authoritarian attitudes deeply.

Building on Neundorf and Pop-Eleches (2020), Besley and Persson (2019) introduce the concept of mutual reinforcement between democratic institutions and democratic values, emphasizing how sustained institutional practices shape cultural attitudes. Besley and Persson (2019) stated that democratic institutions instill democratic cultural values among citizen through inclusive participation, protection of individual rights, and transparent government. Nevertheless, when authoritarian institutions persist, they hold back democratic values' socialization. Persistent authoritarian practices deny individuals democratic experiences, holding back the internalization of democratic values such as tolerance for political pluralism, civic trust, and collective political decisions. This results into underdeveloped democratic values, which also reduces the social demand for democratic governance and weakens the incentive to maintain or deepen democratic institutions. Besley and Persson (2019) highlighted a pattern, which says persistent authoritarian practices block out democratic socialization, making internalized anti-democratic values that hold back the development of democratic values and institutions.

Moving beyond socialization, Martínez-Bravo et al. (2017) studied an institutional mechanism explaining how elites from authoritarian regimes retain power and limit democratic experiences. According to their argument, during transitions to democracy, local elites from previous authoritarian regimes often remain influential.

2.2 Previous Empirical Studies

Martínez-Bravo et al. (2017) explore how elite persistence from authoritarian regimes affects governance quality during democratic transitions, focusing specifically on Indonesia's transition from Soeharto's New Order regime. Employing a difference-in-differences methodology and exploiting the quasi-random variation of mayors' appointment cycles, they measure the impact of extended exposure to authoritarian-era mayors on subsequent governance outcomes include quality of public good provision, elite persistence, and political competition. Their findings clearly indicate that longer exposure to old-regime elites during democratization is associated with decreased public good provision, weaker rule of law, increased rent-seeking activities, and significantly lower political competition. Importantly, they document greater electoral support for Golkar, the authoritarian regime's political party, even years after democratization. This study provides empirical evidence of how elites' strategic retention of informal power (de facto power) can compromise the effectiveness of newly established democratic institutions and subsequently diminish democratic support among the public.

Poczter and Pepinsky (2016) provide a complementary empirical investigation into elite continuity in Indonesia post-democratization, using a unique dataset comprising biographical data of 1,646 political elites active after Soeharto's regime. Employing logistic regression analyses, Poczter and Pepinsky (2016) investigate the relationship between elites' backgrounds and their subsequent influence in democratic politics. The analysis reveals substantial continuities from the authoritarian New Order,

Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2014) examine the long-term effects of communist socialization on individuals' political and economic preferences in post-communist European countries. The study uses age-period-cohort analyses based on multi-country survey data to isolate the effects of individual exposure to communist institutions (main IV). The dependent variables include support for democracy and capitalism. Findings indicate strong indoctrination effects: individuals with greater exposure to communism exhibit significantly lower support for democratic and capitalist values. The effects are particularly pronounced among those exposed to the most repressive phases of communism. This study demonstrates how authoritarian socialization can lead to enduring anti-democratic attitudes, providing robust evidence that prolonged authoritarian exposure significantly reduces democratic support.

Sanches and Gorbunova (2016) investigate the impact of early authoritarian socialization on democratic support among Portuguese citizens decades after the Carnation Revolution. Using regression on survey data, Sanches and Gorbunova (2016) find that individuals whose formative years fell under the authoritarian Estado Novo, using age cohorts, report significantly lower satisfaction with democracy. Further, perceptions regarding improved governance quality and economic performance after democratization positively influence democratic satisfaction. The findings underline the lasting impact of early authoritarian socialization.

Finally, Slothuus and Bisgaard (2021) investigate how political parties shape public opinion in Denmark by analyzing panel survey data collected around two major policy reversals concerning welfare reforms. Utilizing difference-in-differences

those of the broader population (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2005, 2008). Such practices often leave citizens perceiving little substantive change under democratic reform, fostering disillusionment with democratic governance. As a result, citizens gain limited democratic exposure, which reinforces authoritarian norms and makes them less likely to internalize democratic values (Neundorf & Pop-Eleches, 2020). Persistent authoritarian institutions hinder democratic socialization, creating a feedback loop that sustains anti-democratic attitudes and weakens citizens' overall support for democracy (Besley & Persson, 2019).

2.4 Research Hypothesis

Historical support for authoritarian regime, especially during periods of democratic transition, continues to shape individual's democratic attitudes. Individuals currently residing in areas that demonstrated strong support for authoritarian regime during the first post-transition elections are more likely to exhibit weaker support to democratic value

responses to a more practical scale: from 1 (not important at all) to 4 (very important). A higher value of the indicator reflects that an individual places greater importance on honest elections, indicating that this individual has stronger democratic attitudes and a preference for a more democratic system.

2. Indicator 2: Strong Leader

This indicator is derived from WVS (Q235): *What do you think about having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections?* Individual answers this question on scale 1 (very good) to 4 (very bad). A higher value of the indicator reflects that an individual rejects the idea of having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections, indicating that this individual has stronger democratic attitudes and a preference more for a more democratic system.

3. Indicator 3: Democratic

This indicator is derived from WVS (Q238): *What do you think about having a democratic political system?* Individual answers this question on scale 1 (very good) to 4 (very bad). For ease of interpretation, we rescaled the responses to a more practical scale: from 1 (very bad) to 4 (very good). A higher value of the indicator reflects that an individual favors the idea of having a democratic political system, indicating that this individual has stronger democratic attitudes and a preference for a more democratic system.

3.1.2 Main Explanatory Variable: Authoritarian Legacy

The authoritarian regime is represented by Golkar as it was the authoritarian regime party. During the first election post democratic-transition, Golkar was still the most second voted party across the country.

In specific, we use two measures. The first measure is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if Golkar won in a district during Indonesia's first legislative election in 1999, and 0 if otherwise. The second measure is Golkar's vote share during Indonesia's first legislative election in 1999. Data was obtained from KPU (Komisi Pemilihan Umum).

3.1.3 Control Variables

To avoid a biased estimates, the model also includes several control variables. The control variables include individual-level controls and regional-level controls. Following previous empirical research by Jadhav (2024), this research applied demographics controls to capture the differences of each individuals' characteristics in different contexts. The description for individual-level controls is as follow:

1. Media Exposure

Media exposure can serve as a channel through which individuals gain political information and are exposed to democratic norms and discourses. Mufune (2015) found that higher exposure to media increases awareness and understanding of democratic values, which can affect individual support for democratic values. In this research, media exposure is measured with three

Persson, 2019). This variable is measured in years. Data was obtained from WVS.

3. Male

Inglehart and Norris (2003) argue that due to cultural and structural factors, women tend to show more democratic attitudes. This variable is a dummy variable measured with 1 if the individual is a male, and 0 if the individual is a woman. Data was obtained from WVS.

4. Education

Education affects individual support for democracy by increasing political awareness and civic values, which are essential for democratic engagement (Lipset, 1959). This variable is measured as years of schooling. Data was obtained from WVS.

5. Income

Individuals with higher economic resources are more likely to feel politically empowered and trust democratic institutions (Welzel & Inglehart, 2005). According to Anthony Downs (1957) economic theory of democracy, individuals vote rationally to maximize their own utility. Therefore, income level influences voting behavior, as higher income voters are more likely to support parties favoring lower taxes and market-oriented policies, while lower income voters tend to prefer parties promoting redistribution and welfare programs that enhance economic welfare. This variable is a categorical variable

more diversity in their political preferences, thus making democratic political system preferable. In this research, population is measured as the total number of residents in each region in 2018 (log-transformed), using data from BPS (*Badan Pusat Statistik*).

2. Economic growth

Economic growth is often associated with greater political awareness, higher education levels, and increased exposure to democratic values. According to Lipset (1959), regions with higher income levels are more likely to support democratic governance. In this research, economic growth is measured using constant Gross Regional Domestic Product (GRDP) for the year 2018 in Indonesia, log-transformed, with data obtained from BPS.

3. Human Resources Quality

Regions with better human resources quality may show higher support for democratic values (Lipset, 1959). To measure human resources quality, this research used Human Development Index (HDI) in the year 2018 in Indonesia, which combines indicators of health, education, and income, providing a broad view of well-being. The data was obtained from BPS.

4. Public Spending

Building on Lipset (1959) argument that socioeconomic development underpins democratic legitimacy, higher public spending on sectors such as health and education can be interpreted as a sign of government responsiveness, which may strengthen individuals' satisfaction and trust in democratic

Table 3.1
Description for All Variables

Variables	Year	Source
Individual's Support for Democratic Values		
1. Honest elections	2018	WVS
2. Having a strong leader	2018	WVS
3. Having a democratic political system	2018	WVS
4. Having a religious law where there are no elections or political parties	2018	WVS
5. Choosing their leaders through free elections	2018	WVS
6. The importance of democracy	2018	WVS
Authoritarian Legacy		
1. Golkar vote share in 1999 legislative election (%)	1999	KPU
2. Winner between Golkar vs other parties participated in 1999 legislative election (dummy, 1 if Golkar won)	1999	KPU
Individual Characteristics		
1. Age (year)	2018	WVS
2. Gender (dummy, 1 if male)	2018	WVS
3. Income (categorical, 1 if very low, 10 if very high)	2018	WVS
4. Religion (dummy, 1 if Moslem)	2018	WVS
5. TV (dummy, 1 if often/everday, 0 if sometimes to never)	2018	WVS
6. Internet (dummy, 1 if often/everyday, 0 if sometimes to never)	2018	WVS
7. Social Media (dummy, 1 if often/everyday, 0 if sometimes to never)	2018	WVS
8. Education (Years of schooling)	2018	WVS
9. Type of settlements (dummy, 1 if urban, 0 if rural)	2018	WVS
Socio Economic Conditions in the Districts		
1. Population (Log)	2018	BPS
2. Economic growth (Log GRDP)	2018	BPS
3. Human capital (HDI, scaled 0-100)	2018	BPS
4. Public spending for education (%total spending)	2018	DJPk
5. Public spending for health (%total spending)	2018	DJPk
Political Characteristics		
1. Golkar vote share in 2004 legislative election (%)	2004	KPU
2. PDIP vote share in 2004 legislative election (%)	2004	KPU
3. Golkar vote share in 2009 legislative election (%)	2009	KPU
4. PDIP vote share in 2009 legislative election (%)	2009	KPU
5. Golkar vote share in 2014 legislative election (%)	2014	KPU
6. PDIP vote share in 2014 legislative election (%)	2014	KPU

characteristics which includes population, economic growth, human resources quality, public spending, and vote shares of Golkar and PDIP in the 2004, 2009, and 2014 legislative elections. Finally, the model also includes province fixed effects to capture unobserved heterogeneity specific to province.

The second model specification is as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{logit} & P(\text{demsup}_{idp} \leq j) \\ & = \alpha_j + \beta_1(\text{GolkarShare}_{dp} + \beta_2 X_{idp} + \beta_3 Z_{dp} + \psi_p + \varepsilon_{id} \end{aligned}$$

where $P(\text{demsup}_{idp} \leq j)$ is the probability of individual i in district d in province p in supporting democratic values equal or less than j . *GolkarShare* variable is the vote share measured in percentage for authoritarian legacy in district d in province p , that if Golkar won the legislative election in 1999 in that region, it equals 1, and 0 if another party won. The variable X_{idp} contains individual-level controls including media exposure and demographics controls. The variable Z_{dp} contains regional-level controls and political characteristics which includes population, economic growth, human resources quality, public spending, and vote shares of Golkar and PDIP in the 2004, 2009, and 2014 legislative elections. Finally, the model also includes province fixed effects to capture unobserved heterogeneity specific to province.

The ordinal logistic model is estimated using the maximum likelihood method, which finds parameter values that maximize the probability (likelihood) of observing

multicollinearity, meaning that if $VIF > 10$, the variable has a multicollinearity problem.


4. Linearity in the logit for continuous predictors, because continuous predictors are assumed to have a linear relationship with the log-odds of the outcome.

3.3.1 Heterogeneity Effect Analysis

The effect of authoritarian legacy is assumed to differ among ages (cohorts). Cohorts that only experienced post-democratic transition is assumed to have different levels of support for democratic values compared to the cohorts that experienced both post-democratic transition and the New Order's authoritarian regime. Neundorf and Pop-Eleches (2020) argue that late adolescence and early adulthood are formative years when political attitudes and beliefs solidify. Those who were 17 or younger in the 1999 Indonesia's legislative election were still likely undergone political socialization during the transition to democracy, meaning their attitudes are assumed to be more exposed to new democratic institutions. In contrast, older individuals were largely socialized under the New Order's regime, making their political outcome more influenced by non-democratic norms. This cohort distinction allows the analysis to capture whether early exposure to democracy leads to greater support for democratic values, even in areas with persistent authoritarian institutional values. This research divides the cohorts into two types:

Furthermore, this research uses *pseudo-R²* to indicate the proportion of variation in the dependent variable explained by the model. A higher value would indicate a better fitting model.

Likelihood Ratio test is also conducted to determine whether the full model provides a significantly better fit than the null model. This compares the model with explanatory variables significantly improves the model. A higher LR statistic indicates that the predictors jointly contribute to explaining variation in the dependent variable.



Elections Commission (KPU). These reforms led to the first democratic legislative in 1999. The Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP), led by Megawati Soekarnoputri, won the first election with 33.7% of the votes (KPU, 1999). However, Golkar, despite its declining popularity, still managed to secure the second position with 22.4% of the vote and retained strong influence in many districts, particularly through bureaucratic and informal patronage networks (Tomsa, 2008; Mietzner, 2010).

Although Indonesia successfully held its direct presidential election in 2004 and expanded its political freedom, democratic consolidation faced ongoing challenges. According to Freedom House (2018), Indonesia's status declined from "Free" in the 2000s to "Partly Free" by 2018, with deteriorating civil liberties and growing restrictions on press and political opposition. The Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index (2018) rated Indonesia as a "flawed democracy" with a score of 6.39 out of 10. Despite democratic reforms, authoritarian legacies remained visible. Golkar remained one of Indonesia's most influential political parties, reclaiming the top position in the DPR in 2004, and maintaining strong performance with 14.75% of votes in 2014. Scholars such as Poczter and Pepinsky (2016) have argued that Golkar's continued success is a case of institutional persistence, where former authoritarian elites adapt to democratic competition without losing local power structures, sustaining influence through clientelism, bureaucracy, and economic leverage.

4.1.2 The First Legislative Election Post-Democratic Transition in Indonesia

Indonesia held its first post-New Order legislative election on 7 June 1999, under a reformed electoral framework that reintroduced multiparty competition and

Table 4.1
The 1999 Legislative Election Vote Results

No.	Party's Name	Vote Count	Vote Share
1	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan	34.991.055	33,7%
2	Golongan Karya	23.086.507	22,4%
3	Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa	13.390.269	12,6%
4	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan	11.303.788	10,7%
5	Partai Amanat Nasional	7.289.170	7,1%
6	Partai Bulan Bintang	2.015.992	1,9%
7	Partai Keadilan	1.471.952	1,4%
8	Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan	1.077.302	1,0%
9	Partai Nahdlatul Ummat	683.162	0,6%
10	Partai Persatuan	555.970	0,6%

Source: Komisi Pemilihan Umum (1999)

4.2 Data Description

4.2.1 Description of Golkar's Regional Persistence in Indonesia


Table 4.1 shows Golkar's persistence in Indonesia politics through legislative elections from 1999 to 2014. In 1999, the year of Indonesia's first post-Soeharto democratic election, Golkar still managed to win in 43.9% of the observed districts, with an average vote share of 30%, indicating the party's strength despite being closely associated with the authoritarian New Order regime.

Interestingly, Golkar's district level wins increased significantly in 2004 to 66.9%, although its vote share decreased to 24% in the observation. This may reflect Golkar's strategic advantage in certain regions and its ability to win seats through more concentrated support, possibly benefiting from institutional familiarity and local

their leaders in free election?), and number 250 (How important is it for you to live in a democratic country?).

Figure 4.1 showed the response of the individuals for the important of having an honest election. The majority response lies on very important with 88% shares of the responses, meanwhile only 0.6% responded with not important at all.

Figure 4.1
Statistics of Honest Election Variable




Source: World Values Survey (2018)

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Figure 4.3 showed the majority response for having a democratic political is good and very good with 48.6% and 42.2%, and only 4.2% responded with very bad.

Figure 4.3
Statistics of Democratic Variable




Source: World Values Survey (2018)

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Figure 4.5 shows responses for respondents' importance in having to choose their leaders through free elections. 38.3% respondents responded 10, that it is very important to have free elections, and only 6% responded 1, which is not important at all. This describes the majority lies on very important, meaning respondents are likely to support democratic values.

Figure 4.5
Statistics of Free Elections Variable



Source: World Values Survey (2018)

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dependent variable strong leader, column (3) shows the result for the dependent variable democratic system, column (4) shows the result for the dependent variable religious political system without parties or elections is, column (5) shows the results for the dependent variable free election, and column (6) shows the results for the dependent variable importance of living in a democratic country. Odds ratio for each of the main explanatory variables are presented at the bottom.

All the estimation results have been checked for multicollinearity problems, and it was shown that for every estimation, the variables *log_population* and *log_grdp* have VIF values over 10, meaning they have multicollinearity. No treatments have been done for the two variables because they only served as the control variables.

In addition, the model uses ordinal logistic regression which requires doing parallel lines test to see a consistent effect in every single category. Since the main explanatory variables do not violate the test, we do not conduct any treatments.

The regression results from Table 4.3 shows individual's support for democratic attitudes associated with authoritarian legacy. In general, only for dependent variables "*strong leader*" and "*religious system*", *golkardum99* appears with the expected signs, namely negative signs. In contrast, for dependent variables "*honest election*", "*democratic*", "*free elections*" and "*democracy importance*", *golkardum99* comes with positive signs, not as expected. With these dependent variables, *golkardum99* are expected to have negative coefficients but only two appears negative. However, only two variables are significant, namely "*strong leader*" (at 10%) and "*democracy importance*" (at 1%).

urban(=1)	0,284 (0,263)	0,058 (0,138)	0,240 (0,151)	0,159 (0,137)	0,095 (0,139)	0,038 (0,141)
log_grdp	-0,273 (0,300)	0,088 (0,174)	-0,134 (0,185)	0,010 (0,170)	-0,142 (0,169)	-0,533*** (0,173)
log_population	0,269 (0,404)	-0,002 (0,233)	-0,099 (0,249)	-0,116 (0,227)	0,292 (0,228)	0,631*** (0,233)
educspend	-0,801 (2,330)	-0,039 (1,207)	0,115 (1,345)	0,165 (1,205)	0,977 (1,202)	0,665 (1,247)
healthspend	-5,035 (3,351)	-0,729 (1,899)	-0,070 (2,048)	-1,693 (1,871)	0,192 (1,903)	1,604 (1,917)
hdi	0,033 (0,034)	0,005 (0,018)	0,014 (0,020)	0,014 (0,018)	0,014 (0,018)	0,042** (0,019)
golkar04	-2,370 (4,370)	-2,795 (2,470)	0,818 (2,683)	0,014 (2,461)	-1,211 (2,465)	2,986 (2,507)
pdip04	4,271 (3,713)	-0,631 (2,201)	1,378 (2,389)	0,917 (2,173)	5,143** (2,173)	2,152 (2,216)
golkar09	4,960 (3,062)	2,220 (1,777)	0,954 (1,935)	1,707 (1,792)	-2,024 (1,773)	-1,884 (1,788)
pdip09	1,337 (2,127)	1,809 (1,297)	2,984** (1,398)	0,501 (1,286)	-0,439 (1,307)	0,678 (1,310)
golkar14	-2,474 (2,475)	-1,274 (1,482)	-1,318 (1,652)	-2,200 (1,516)	3,164** (1,505)	-0,162 (1,511)
pdip14	-4,977** (2,343)	-2,006 (1,309)	-2,475* (1,461)	-0,114 (1,332)	-1,264 (1,287)	-1,007 (1,341)
AIC	1425,32	4159,84	3063,28	4110,09	5919,79	5209,04
Likelihood Ratio	81,82	164,7	136,27	95,14	117,92	108,91
Pseudo-r2	0,057	0,039	0,044	0,023	0,02	0,021
Province FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Obs.	1563	1563	1563	1563	1563	1563
Odds Ratio golkar99dum	1,511	0,701	1,433	0,922	1,306	1,849

Notes: Observation units are 3200 individuals. The statistics software used for this automatically estimate observations that do not have missing values. Main explanatory variable (golkar99dum) is the winning for Golkar in 1999 legislative election. Main outcome variables include several democracy measures according to Acemoglu & Robinson, 2005, with data obtained from WVS wave 7.

*** Significant at 1% level

** Significant at 5% level

*Significant at 10% level

	(0,286)	(0,159)	(0,174)	(0,159)	(0,155)	(0,158)
male(=1)	-0,141	0,071	0,064	0,070	0,556***	0,129
	(0,165)	(0,096)	(0,104)	(0,096)	(0,096)	(0,099)
age	0,021***	0,022***	0,017***	0,001	0,012***	0,013***
	(0,007)	(0,004)	(0,005)	(0,004)	(0,004)	(0,004)
educ	0,055**	0,102***	0,085***	0,036**	0,011	0,034**
	(0,024)	(0,014)	(0,015)	(0,014)	(0,014)	(0,014)
income	0,046	-0,017	0,004	-0,019	0,011	-0,076***
	(0,036)	(0,021)	(0,023)	(0,021)	(0,021)	(0,022)
muslim(=1)	-1,037**	0,026	-0,191	-0,634***	-0,183	-0,136
	(0,448)	(0,219)	(0,238)	(0,218)	(0,219)	(0,228)
urban(=1)	0,254	0,039	0,250	0,147	0,079	0,074
	(0,266)	(0,140)	(0,153)	(0,139)	(0,141)	(0,142)
log_grdp	-0,259	0,056	-0,107	0,004	-0,122	-0,486***
	(0,300)	(0,173)	(0,184)	(0,169)	(0,168)	(0,173)
log_population	0,210	0,017	-0,123	-0,123	0,246	0,611***
	(0,405)	(0,232)	(0,249)	(0,227)	(0,228)	(0,233)
educspend	-0,686	0,349	-0,192	0,332	1,020	-0,054
	(2,375)	(1,236)	(1,371)	(1,229)	(1,228)	(1,276)
healthspend	-5,347	-0,297	-0,523	-1,649	-0,285	0,938
	(3,301)	(1,872)	(2,024)	(1,848)	(1,876)	(1,891)
hdi	0,025	0,011	0,008	0,015	0,007	0,032*
	(0,033)	(0,018)	(0,020)	(0,018)	(0,018)	(0,018)
golkar04	-0,427	-1,296	-0,006	0,868	-0,371	0,129
	(5,114)	(2,895)	(3,187)	(2,914)	(2,930)	(2,965)
pdip04	4,609	0,228	0,722	1,316	5,262**	0,483
	(3,879)	(2,279)	(2,481)	(2,258)	(2,254)	(2,301)
golkar09	4,680	2,557	0,615	1,781	-2,279	-2,412
	(3,076)	(1,768)	(1,921)	(1,782)	(1,765)	(1,773)
pdip09	1,013	1,726	2,989**	0,400	-0,674	0,867
	(2,167)	(1,311)	(1,415)	(1,305)	(1,319)	(1,322)
golkar14	-2,711	-1,791	-0,951	-2,414	3,129**	0,728
	(2,581)	(1,519)	(1,680)	(1,544)	(1,538)	(1,543)
pdip14	-4,752**	-2,114	-2,333	-0,123	-1,121	-0,742
	(2,328)	(1,307)	(1,457)	(1,330)	(1,284)	(1,335)
AIC	1426,29	4161,46	3065,47	4109,9	5921,31	5212,7
Likelihood Ratio	80,84	163,08	134,09	95,33	116,4	105,25
Pseudo-r2	0,057	0,038	0,043	0,023	0,02	0,02
Province FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Obs.	1563	1563	1563	1563	1563	1563
Odds Ratio	0,174	0,12	3,952	0,343	0,498	48,56
golkar99share						

golkardum99 appears on dependent variable “*strong leader*”, namely a negative sign. In contrast, for dependent variables “*honest election*”, “*democratic*”, “*religious system*”, “*free elections*”, and “*importance democracy*”, *golkardum99* shows positive signs, not as expected. With these dependent variables, *golkardum99* is expected to have negative signs but only one appear negative. However, only one variable is significant, namely *strong leader* (at 5%). The interpretation of significant variable is as follow. In column (2) with dependent variable *strong leader*, the coefficient of *golkardum99* is -0,575 and its odds ratio is 0,563. This implies that individuals who lived in a region where Golkar won the 1999 legislative election have a probability of 0,563 to think that having a strong leader is very bad, *ceteris paribus*.

Cohorts that experienced both post-democratic transition and New Order’s regime is shown in Panel Ib. In general, only for dependent variables “*strong leader*” and “*religious system*” show the expected negative signs. In contrast, for dependent variables “*honest election*”, “*democratic*”, “*free elections*”, and “*democracy importance*”, *golkardum99* come with positive sign, not as expected. With those dependent variables, *golkardum99* are expected to have negative signs, but only two appears negative. However, only two variables are significant, namely *democratic* (at 5%) and *democracy importance* (at 1%). The interpretation of significant variables are as follow. In column (3) with dependent variable *democratic* the coefficient of *golkardum99* is 0,890 and its odds ratio is 2,435. This means that individuals who lived in a region in which Golkar won the 1999 legislative election, would have the probability of 2,435 higher of believing that having a democratic system is good, *ceteris*

4.5 Discussion

The baseline estimation results show individuals who lived in a region where authoritarian legacy still consists during democratic transition. The results are summarized as this: individuals who currently live in a region where Golkar won and gained larger vote share during democratic transition tend to give less support for democratic values.

These findings are aligned with Martínez-Bravo et al. (2017), who found that regions governed by New Order elites, that were mostly affiliated with Golkar party would generate lower democratic institution and higher sustained elites persistence, which could explain why individuals from those regions express weaker support for democratic values. The negative relationship between individuals support for democratic values and Golkar's victory also could be seen as the caused of elite continuity post-democratization, particularly through networks of military and bureaucratic elites, which likely limited exposure to democratic values (Poczter and Pepinsky, 2016).

Similarly, Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2014) and Sanches and Gorbunova (2016) strengthen the findings by showing that individuals who were socialized under authoritarian norms tend to develop anti-democratic norms even decades later. Jadhav (2024) reinforces this by showing how political regimes shape value priorities, where individuals in authoritarian contexts show weaker support to democratic values. Furthermore, Slotuhaus and Bisgaard (2021) explained how elite influence, such as

environments can sustain attitudes that does not favor democratic values. In this case, authoritarian socialization may still occur through community norms, local governance, or elite narratives retained by Golkar.


In contrast, individuals who experienced both transitional democracy and the New Order's regime tend to show stronger support for democratic values, even in regions where Golkar gained victory. Even this seems to contradict Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2014) findings, it can be understood through the perspective of Besley and Persson (2019). They argue that people form their views based on the institutions they have experienced over time. Those who lived through the New Order's regime may be more aware of what it means to live without political freedom, making them value democratic values once the transition happened. Even if Golkar continued to win in their area, these individuals might still recognize the differences between the New Order's regime and the new democratic reform.

Overall, the results can explained that the persistence of Golkar after democratization would show a lower support for individual's democratic values. Jadhav (2014) shows that long-term exposure to authoritarian institutions creates different belief systems for individuals, which includes for supporting democratic values. Neundorf and Pop-Eleches (2020) also explains how authoritarian institutional environments directly affects individuals' political attitudes, by internalizing the values of authoritarian institutions and socialization, this would weakens individuals' support for democratic values.

violence, local elite capture, or civic education programs across different education levels or regions. Third, this research is a quantitative one, where it may not subjectively represent each of individuals' experience to non-democratic values.

5.3 Suggestions

Looking from the research limitations, the suggestions could be described as follows. First, the variable for authoritarian legacy can include more variables that could represent de facto power. Second, other factors such as historical factors and elite continuity can be included for the controls. Third, personal experience for non-democratic experience can be measured qualitatively since individuals do not go through the same experience.



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APPENDIX

Appendix A.

Description of World Values Survey

The World Values Survey (WVS) is an international research program focused on scientific and academic studies related to social, political, economic, religious, and cultural values of people around the world. In general, the aim of this program is to analyze values, beliefs, and social norms in society from a cross-national comparative perspective within a specific timeframe. WVS consists of nationally representative surveys using a structured questionnaire. The main research instrument used in this program is a social values survey conducted globally every five years. The primary method of data collection in the WVS survey is face-to-face interviews at respondents' homes. The minimum sample size (the total number of interviews compiled into national-level data) in most countries is around 1,200. The samples themselves represent all individuals aged 18 and above living in private households, regardless of their citizenship status or language. The program initially began in Europe (European Values Survey) initiated by Professor Ronald Inglehart in 1981. The most recent wave of WVS (WVS-7) began in mid-2017 and, after a one-year delay due to the COVID-19 pandemic, officially ended on 31 December 2021. The next WVS wave (WVS-8) is planned

system where they do not have parties or elections; there are no political parties or elections.

have parties or elections; parties or elections.

scaled 1-4, 1 is very good,

2 is good, 3 is bad, 4 is

very bad)

Free Elections	Questionnaire	Q243	People choose their
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(Choose leaders through leaders in free elections

free elections; scaled from

1-10, 1 not important at all

- 10 is very important)

Importance Democracy	Questionnaire	Q250	How important it is for
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(living in a democratic people to live in a

country; scaled 1-10, 1 not democratic country?

important at all – 10 is

very important)

SEMARANG
FEB UNDIP

Appendix D. Table A3
Proportional Odds and Multicollinearity Test Honest Election Model

Response Variable	Predictor Variable	Control Variables	Parallel Lines Test	Multicollinearity Test
Honest Elections	golcardum99	tv, internet, socmed, gender, age, educ, income, religion, log_population, log_grdp, hdi, educspend, healthspend, urbanrural, golkar04share, pdip04share, golkar09share, pdip09share, golkar14share, pdip14share	Violations in tv (0,01) and golkar09share (0,03)	VIF < 10 (except log_population & log_grdp)
Honest Elections	golkar99share	tv, internet, socmed, gender, age, educ, income, religion, log_population, log_grdp, hdi, educspend, healthspend, urbanrural, golkar04share, pdip04share, golkar09share, pdip09share, golkar14share, pdip14share	Violations in tv (0,01) and golkar09share (0,03)	VIF < 10 (except log_population & log_grdp)

Appendix E. Table A4
Proportional Odds and Multicollinearity Test Strong Leader Model

Response Variable	Predictor Variable	Control Variables	Parallel Lines Test	Multicollinearity Test
Strong Leader	golcardum99	tv, internet, socmed, gender, age, educ, income, religion, log_population, log_grdp, hdi, educspend, healthspend, urbanrural, golkar04share, pdip04share, golkar09share, pdip09share, golkar14share, pdip14share	Violations in tv (0,001), internet (0,0001), socmed (0,0001), gender (0,03), age (0,0001), and educ (0,0001)	VIF < 10 (except log_population & log_grdp)
Strong Leader	golkar99share	tv, internet, socmed, gender, age, educ, income, religion, log_population, log_grdp, hdi, educspend, healthspend, urbanrural, golkar04share, pdip04share, golkar09share, pdip09share, golkar14share, pdip14share	Violations in tv (0,001), internet (0,0001), socmed (0,0001), gender (0,03), age (0,0001), and educ (0,0001)	VIF < 10 (except log_population & log_grdp)

Appendix H. Table A7
Proportional Odds and Multicollinearity Test Free Elections Model

Response Variable	Predictor Variable	Control Variables	Parallel Lines Test	Multicollinearity Test
Free Election	golcardum99	tv, internet, socmed, gender, age, educ, income, religion, log_population, log_grdp, hdi, educspend, healthspend, urbanrural, golkar04share, pdip04share, golkar09share, pdip09share, golkar14share, pdip14share	Violations in tv (0,01), socmed (0,03), educ (0,0001), and income (0,0001)	VIF < 10 (except log_population & log_grdp)
Free Elections	golkar99share	tv, internet, socmed, gender, age, educ, income, religion, log_population, log_grdp, hdi, educspend, healthspend, urbanrural, golkar04share, pdip04share, golkar09share, pdip09share, golkar14share, pdip14share	Violations in tv (0,01), socmed (0,03), educ (0,0001), and income (0,0001)	VIF < 10 (except log_population & log_grdp)

Appendix I. Table A8
Proportional Odds and Multicollinearity Test Democracy Importance Model

Response Variable	Predictor Variable	Control Variables	Parallel Lines Test	Multicollinearity Test
Democracy Importance	golcardum99	tv, internet, socmed, gender, age, educ, income, religion, log_population, log_grdp, hdi, educspend, healthspend, urbanrural, golkar04share, pdip04share, golkar09share, pdip09share, golkar14share, pdip14share	Violations in tv (0,0001), internet (0,0001), socmed (0,0001), age (0,0007), and educ (0,0001)	VIF < 10 (except log_population & log_grdp)
Democracy Importance	golkar99share	tv, internet, socmed, gender, age, educ, income, religion, log_population, log_grdp, hdi, educspend, healthspend, urbanrural, golkar04share, pdip04share, golkar09share, pdip09share, golkar14share, pdip14share	Violations in tv (0,0001), internet (0,0001), socmed (0,0001), age (0,0007), and educ (0,0001)	VIF < 10 (except log_population & log_grdp)

golkar09	5,611 (4,425)	2,901 (2,607)	-2,131 (2,915)	2,578 (2,756)	-1,130 (2,748)	-3,840 (2,705)
pdip09	2,056 (2,654)	2,320 (1,638)	1,378 (1,788)	1,468 (1,638)	1,813 (1,680)	2,671 (1,738)
golkar14	-6,622* (3,831)	-2,662 (2,314)	0,908 (2,692)	-4,034 (2,479)	0,752 (2,405)	-2,411 (2,469)
pdip14	-8,069** (3,455)	-2,266 (1,861)	-0,526 (2,102)	-0,220 (1,883)	-2,832 (1,837)	-3,897** (1,952)
AIC	724,16	2259,04	1614,06	2222,13	3020,8	2573,3
Likelihood Ratio	67,38	90,93	95,11	75,76	65,86	86,46
Pseudo-r2	0,094	0,04	0,058	0,034	0,022	0,034
Province FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Obs.	820	820	820	820	820	820
Odds Ratio	2,177	0,943	2,435	0,872	1,449	3,388
golkar99share						

Notes: Observation units are 3200 individuals. The statistics software used for this automatically estimate observations that do not have missing values. Main explanatory variable (golcardum99) is the winning for Golkar in 1999 legislative election. Main outcome variables include several democracy measures according to Acemoglu & Robinson, 2005, with data obtained from WVS wave 7.

*** Significant at 1% level

** Significant at 5% level

*Significant at 10% level

Appendix K. Table A10
Ordinal Logistic Regression Estimation Result For Authoritarian Legacy
Measured With Golkar Winning in 1999 Legislative Election (Cohort Transition
Only)

	honestelect (1)	strongleader (2)	democratic (3)	religious (4)	freeelect (5)	importdemoc (6)
golcardum99	0,214 (0,448)	-0,575** (0,288)	0,009 (0,302)	0,010 (0,281)	0,115 (0,278)	0,170 (0,288)
tv	1,085*** (0,348)	-0,065 (0,267)	0,010 (0,283)	-0,346 (0,271)	0,559** (0,255)	0,080 (0,263)
internet	0,143 (0,378)	-0,214 (0,225)	0,300 (0,242)	0,049 (0,226)	0,373* (0,216)	0,519** (0,220)
socmed	0,079 (0,373)	-0,053 (0,230)	0,072 (0,244)	-0,097 (0,231)	-0,049 (0,220)	-0,231 (0,221)
male(=1)	-0,164 (0,238)	-0,035 (0,143)	0,051 (0,154)	-0,153 (0,143)	0,593*** (0,142)	-0,058 (0,144)
age	0,025 (0,023)	0,028** (0,014)	0,048*** (0,015)	0,002 (0,014)	0,029** (0,014)	0,045*** (0,014)
educ	0,081**	0,079***	0,108***	0,026	0,036	0,039

Appendix L. Table A11
Full Estimation Result For Honest Election With All Samples

Dependent Variable: Importance of Having an Honest Election		
	Model 1	Model 2
golcardum99	0,413 (0,372)	
golkar99share		-1,747 (3,379)
tv	0,909*** (0,217)	0,904*** (0,217)
internet	0,187 (0,296)	0,184 (0,296)
socmed	0,206 (0,286)	0,203 (0,286)
male(=1)	-0,139 (0,165)	-0,141 (0,165)
age	0,021*** (0,007)	0,021*** (0,007)
educ	0,055** (0,024)	0,055** (0,024)
income	0,051 (0,036)	0,046 (0,036)
muslim(=1)	-1,036** (0,448)	-1,037** (0,448)
urban(=1)	0,284 (0,263)	0,254 (0,266)
log_grdp	-0,273 (0,300)	-0,259 (0,300)
log_population	0,269 (0,404)	0,210 (0,405)
educspend	-0,801 (2,330)	-0,686 (2,375)
healthspend	-5,035 (3,351)	-5,347 (3,301)
hdi	0,033 (0,034)	0,025 (0,033)
golkar04	-2,370 (4,370)	-0,427 (5,114)
pdip04	4,271 (3,713)	4,609 (3,879)

	(0,219)		(0,219)			
urban(=1)	0,058		0,039			
	(0,138)		(0,140)			
log_grdp	0,088		0,056			
	(0,174)		(0,173)			
log_population	-0,002		0,017			
	(0,233)		(0,232)			
educspend	-0,039		0,349			
	(1,207)		(1,236)			
healthspend	-0,729		-0,297			
	(1,899)		(1,872)			
hdi	0,005		0,011			
	(0,018)		(0,018)			
golkar04	-2,795		-1,296			
	(2,470)		(2,895)			
pdip04	-0,631		0,228			
	(2,201)		(2,279)			
golkar09	2,220		2,557			
	(1,777)		(1,768)			
pdip09	1,809		1,726			
	(1,297)		(1,311)			
golkar14	-1,274		-1,791			
	(1,482)		(1,519)			
pdip14	-2,006		-2,114			
	(1,309)		(1,307)			
AIC	4159,84		4161,46			
Likelihood Ratio	164,7		163,08			
Pseudo-r2	0,039		0,038			
Province FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Obs.	1563		1563			
Odds Ratio	0,701		0,12			

Notes: Observation units are 3200 individuals. The statistics software used for this automatically estimate observations that do not have missing values

*** Significant at 1% level

** Significant at 5% level

*Significant at 10% level


FEB UNDIP

	(1,935)	(1,921)				
pdip09	2,984**	2,989**				
	(1,398)	(1,415)				
golkar14	-1,318	-0,951				
	(1,652)	(1,680)				
pdip14	-2,475*	-2,333				
	(1,461)	(1,457)				
AIC	3063,28	3065,47				
Likelihood Ratio	136,27	134,09				
Pseudo-r2	0,044	0,043				
Province FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Obs.	1563	1563				
Odds Ratio	1,433	3,952				

Notes: Observation units are 3200 individuals. The statistics software used for this automatically estimate observations that do not have missing values
*** Significant at 1% level
** Significant at 5% level
*Significant at 10% level

Appendix O. Table A14
Full Estimation Result For Religious System With All Samples

Dependent Variable: Having a Religious System without Parties or Elections		
	Model 1	Model 2
golcardum99	-0,081 (0,204)	
golkar99share		-1,070 (1,816)
tv	0,160 (0,166)	0,157 (0,166)
internet	-0,021 (0,159)	-0,020 (0,159)
socmed	-0,104 (0,159)	0,104 (0,159)
male(=1)	0,071 (0,096)	0,070 (0,096)
age	0,001 (0,004)	0,001 (0,004)
educ	0,035** (0,014)	0,036** (0,014)
income	-0,019 (0,021)	-0,019 (0,021)
muslim(=1)	-0,620*** (0,217)	-0,634*** (0,218)



		(1,828)
tv	0,494***	0,493***
	(0,159)	(0,159)
internet	0,137	0,131
	(0,156)	(0,156)
socmed	0,045	0,047
	(0,155)	(0,155)
male(=1)	0,555***	0,556***
	(0,096)	(0,096)
age	0,012***	0,012***
	(0,004)	(0,004)
educ	0,011	0,011
	(0,014)	(0,014)
income	0,014	0,011
	(0,021)	(0,021)
muslim(=1)	-0,177	-0,183
	(0,219)	(0,219)
urban(=1)	0,095	0,079
	(0,139)	(0,141)
log_grdp	-0,142	-0,122
	(0,169)	(0,168)
log_population	0,292	0,246
	(0,228)	(0,228)
educspend	0,977	1,020
	(1,202)	(1,228)
healthspend	0,192	-0,285
	(1,903)	(1,876)
hdi	0,014	0,007
	(0,018)	(0,018)
golkar04	-1,211	-0,371
	(2,465)	(2,930)
pdip04	5,143**	5,262**
	(2,173)	(2,254)
golkar09	-2,024	-2,279
	(1,773)	(1,765)
pdip09	-0,439	-0,674
	(1,307)	(1,319)
golkar14	3,164**	3,129**
	(1,505)	(1,538)
pdip14	-1,264	-1,121
	(1,287)	(1,284)

	(1,247)		(1,276)			
healthspend	1,604		0,938			
	(1,917)		(1,891)			
hdi	0,042**		0,032*			
	(0,019)		(0,018)			
golkar04	2,986		0,129			
	(2,507)		(2,965)			
pdip04	2,152		0,483			
	(2,216)		(2,301)			
golkar09	-1,884		-2,412			
	(1,788)		(1,773)			
pdip09	0,678		0,867			
	(1,310)		(1,322)			
golkar14	-0,162		0,728			
	(1,511)		(1,543)			
pdip14	-1,007		-0,742			
	(1,341)		(1,335)			
AIC	5209,04		5212,7			
Likelihood Ratio	108,91		105,25			
Pseudo-r2	0,021		0,02			
Province FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Obs.	1563		1563			
Odds Ratio	1,849		48,56			
Notes: Observation units are 3200 individuals. The statistics software used for this automatically estimate observations that do not have missing values						
*** Significant at 1% level						
** Significant at 5% level						
*Significant at 10% level						

Declaration of generative AI and AI-assisted technologies in the writing process:

During the preparation of this thesis, the author used ChatGPT in order to improve the readability and language of the manuscript. After using this tool/service, the author reviewed and edited the content as needed and take full responsibility for the content of the published article.