

ABSTRACT

Does democratization displace authoritarian elites? Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) argues that elites utilize *de facto* power to preserve extractive institutions despite formal regime change. This study examines this hypothesis within Indonesia's post-1998 democratic transition. By constructing a novel longitudinal dataset of parliamentary tenure, we analyze the returning Members of Parliament (MPs) from the New Order (1997–1999) to the *Reformasi* (1999–2004). Descriptive statistics establish that 162 (32.4%) of 500 MPs in the first democratic parliament (1999–2004) were returning members of the New Order regime, with Golkar accounting for 55.6% of this group. Furthermore, Linear Probability (LPM) and Probit estimates confirm that affiliation with Golkar significantly increased the probability of elite persistence. We conclude that the 1999 legislative election did not dismantle the New Order's political machinery but rather allowed for the elite capture of new democratic institutions.

Keywords: Institutional Persistence, Returning Members, *De Facto* Power, Golkar

JEL classification: D72, P16, D73, P48

