Are long-tenured CEOs rent seekers? Analysis of cash compensation and post disposal performance

Saito, Yoshie,(2019), Are long-tenured CEOs rent seekers? Analysis of cash compensation and post disposal performance. , Advances in Accounting, UNSPECIFIED

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Are typical long-tenured CEOs rent-seekers? Do compensation committees consider undiversified risk for veteran executives and design their cash pay to limit their risk exposure? Because an exit decision requires board approval, discontinued operations provide a unique setting to analyze intervention by compensation committees. Seasoned managers should require less oversight because their ability has been revealed over time. However, as CEOs advance in their careers, they are more likely to acquire power to influence board decisions. They are also more risk averse and potentially more myopic than younger CEOs because they hold a large undiversified portfolio. Lucrative labor markets for talented retired executives can incentivize long-tenured CEOs to maintain a solid reputation. I reexamine the previously reported differential sensitivity of CEO cash compensation to positive or negative-valued disposal decisions, which can be viewed as rent-seeking. I show that cash pay for veteran CEOs are shielded from the effect of both negative and positive-valued discontinued operations, suggesting that compensation committees alter their cash pay. This evidence does not support rent-seeking. I also find strong evidence that long-tenured CEOs make better exit decisions to improve future firm performance than less experienced executives.
Keywords : Long-tenured CEOs Cash compensation Rent-seeking Exit decisions, UNSPECIFIED
Journal or Publication Title: Advances in Accounting
Volume: 44
Item Type: Article
Subjects: Akuntansi
Depositing User: Users 8 not found.
Date Deposited: 23 Dec 2019 07:01
Last Modified: 23 Dec 2019 07:01

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