Are CFO debt-like compensation incentives associated with financial reporting quality?

Kohlbeck, Mark and Luo, Xin,(2019), Are CFO debt-like compensation incentives associated with financial reporting quality? , Advances in Accounting, UNSPECIFIED

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Abstract

Weinvestigatewhether CFOdebt-like compensation incentives and their alignmentwith CEO debt-like compensation incentives are associated with financial reporting quality. He (2015) finds that CEO debt-like compensation incentives are associated with higher financial reporting quality. Consistent with agency theory, we extend He (2015) by considering CFO debt-like compensation incentives. Overall, we find that CFO debt-like compensation incentives are associated with better financial reporting quality while controlling for CEO debtlike compensation incentives. These effects are present when the CEO and CFO compensation incentives are aligned with the same party. Further, the CFO effect dominates that of the CEO when examining discretionary accruals, and complements the CEO effect for accrual quality. However, we are unable to find any evidence of an incremental joint effect from the alignment of the CEO and CFO debt-like compensation incentives.

Keywords :	CFO debt-like compensation incentive Agency theory Mutual monitoring Financial reporting quality, UNSPECIFIED
Journal or Publication Title:	Advances in Accounting
Volume:	45
Number:	UNSPECIFIED
Item Type:	Article
Subjects:	Akuntansi
Depositing User:	Users 8 not found.
Date Deposited:	26 Dec 2019 01:57
Last Modified:	26 Dec 2019 01:57
URI:	https://repofeb.undip.ac.id/id/eprint/768

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