Mili, Mehdi and Abid, Sam,(2017), Moral hazard and risk-taking incentives in Islamic banks, does franchise value matter! , International Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Finance and Management, UNSPECIFIED
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Abstract
Purpose – This paper aims to examine risk-taking in Islamic banks by exploring moral hazard and owner/manager agency problems simultaneously.
Design/methodology/approach – The authors propose to estimate a model of bank risk-taking that includes both franchise value and ownership structure as explanatory factors of bank risk.
Findings – The results show that franchise value is an important determinant of Islamic bank risk-taking. Banks with high franchise values are less likely to take risks than banks with low franchise value. In contrast, outside block holders have, at best, limited influences on bank risk-taking.
Originality/value – This paper conducts the first empirical examination of the relationship between managerial risk preferences and Islamic banks ownership. The authors examine simultaneously the effect of franchise value and owner/manager problem on Islamic bank risk taking behavior. They consider separately the impact on total risk, systematic risk and bank specific risk.
Keywords : | Islamic banks, Ownership structure, Bank risk-taking, Franchise value, UNSPECIFIED |
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Journal or Publication Title: | International Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Finance and Management |
Volume: | 10 |
Number: | 1 |
Item Type: | Article |
Subjects: | Ekonomi Islam |
Depositing User: | Heru Prastyo |
Date Deposited: | 20 Dec 2019 02:02 |
Last Modified: | 20 Dec 2019 02:02 |
URI: | https://repofeb.undip.ac.id/id/eprint/497 |